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Terrestrial broadcasting in Europe after WRC-15: an End of an Era or a New Beginning? 
The World Radiocommunication Conference of the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) in November 2015 (WRC-15) was not even completely over yet when another international 
organization also headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland – the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) 
published a press release with a title “Broadcasters applaud WRC-15 decision securing future of 
free-to-air broadcasting” (EBU 2015a). The European broadcaster’s worst nightmare – losing the 
priority of TV broadcasting for exclusive use of the remaining part of UHF band below 700 MHz in 
the ITU Region 1 had been successfully defeated with the support of altogether 150 governments. 
And moreover, it was also agreed that the status of the UHF would not be touched or even reviewed 
until eight years later at the WRC-23. So this result could easily be regarded as a complete success 
for European broadcasting. Unfortunately, the consequences of the WRC-15 are far more complex. 
This chapter examines them from three different perspectives. 
Slightly adapting the lines which the former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill used 
to praise the Royal Air Force pilots in 19401, the result of the WRC-15 could be described by 
saying that never in the field of broadcasting was so little celebrated so much by so many. The 
European broadcasters were cheerfully applauding for simply maintaining what was left of the 
earlier status quo, but at the same time WRC-15 confirmed that digital terrestrial television will lose 
about 30 percent of its spectrum resources (96 MHz) and digital radio broadcasting over 40 percent 
of its spectrum allocations (40 MHz) in Europe. The European broadcasters have probably never 
lost such a large amount of spectrum to be reallocated for other purposes in a single WRC. But it 
was perhaps a small sacrifice when compared to possibility of losing the entire UHF band – and 
there was not much left to be done to change the outcome. The battle for 700 MHz was in practice 
lost already at WRC-12 and by leaving the L-band unused, the broadcasters themselves had sealed 
1 “ Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.” See 
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-finest-hour/113-the-few 
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its destiny. The loss of spectrum will have a direct, widespread and profound impact on the future 
of European television and indirectly also on the development of radio broadcasting.  
In addition, if the European broadcasters really thought that the outcome of the WRC-15 
would bring the UHF spectrum band “peace for our time” 2, like Neville Chamberlain - another 
former British Prime Minister - put it after the notorious Munich Conference in September 1938, it 
soon turned out that the future of the UHF band in Europe was going to be much less safe and 
secure than expected. In February 2016, the European Commission started to prepare the Europe-
wide clearance of the 700 MHz band from television use and its coordinated reallocation for mobile 
broadband internet use in. As a part of this plan the Commission introduced also “flexibility option” 
so that the member states could start using part of the dedicated UHF broadcast spectrum below 700 
MHz for other purposes, primarily downlink wireless broadband (EC 2016a; 2016b).  The EBU 
immediately expressed its serious concern (EBU 2016), but it is hardly surprising that the 
Commission is trying to promote its ambitious economic goals for the Digital Single Market with 
all possible means while protecting (at least themost of) the remaining UHF. In addition, the idea of 
flexible downlink-only use of the 470-694 MHz band was not completely new, but discussed as an 
option already in the consultation round of the Lamy Report in 2015 (EBU 2015b) 
Interestingly enough, the European Commission had proposed the EU member states to 
make a binding joint decision of the European Council on voting about the future of UHF at WRC-
15 in advance. The member states formally rejected this idea, as spectrum policy belongs strictly in 
the national competence, but the European governments were practically unanimous in their support 
at WRC-15 for saving the lower part of UHF band for terrestrial television broadcasting. All, except 
one.  Quoting the exact words of Winston Churchill, Finland showed again “what free men can do”3 
and voted against all the other European Union member states to support the release of entire UHF 
                                                          
2 See http://www.britannia.com/history/docs/peacetime.html 
3 See http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/233-1940-the-finest-hour/98-the-war-situation-house-of-
many-mansions 
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band for mobile use on a co-primary basis. This time, the fight against a superior opponent was 
perhaps highly glorious at least to some, but if possible, even more unsuccessful than 75 years 
earlier (against the Soviet Union). (GSMA 2015; Pursiainen 2015) This episode illustrates how 
there are multiple political and economic reasons why even the governments of the EU member 
states are no longer able to agree on the importance of broadcasting for maintaining and renewing 
the European democracy and culture.  
Spectrum release as a by-product of digital TV vs. forced switchover to release spectrum  
Releasing the (first) digital dividend was in many ways more gentle process for the 
European broadcasters than the clearing of the 700 MHz band, which is now about to begin. 
Although digitalization of television was an expensive and burdensome process, many European 
countries and broadcasters were very eager to go digital and to invest in to their future (!), to expand 
their opportunities to create new services and set up new channels. Many governments eventually 
put their well-resourced national public service broadcasters in charge to drive the process of 
digitalization as locomotives and even used their assets to cover the expenses. The main focus of 
the broadcasters was naturally somewhere else than in clearing the spectrum – while the huge 
potential economic value of “reinvesting the analogue spectrum” (Galperin 2004, 166) had been 
well understood by the governments already in the mid-1990s, before any national decisions about 
digitalization were made (Ala-Fossi and Bonet 2016). 
There was relatively lot of time for making the changes. For example in Finland, it took over 
11 years from the Council of State decision in May 1996 to actually switching off the last analogue 
TV transmitter at the end of August 2007, six years after the introduction of digital TV service. An 
international agreement about the location of the digital dividend in the upper UHF band and its 
future purpose was reached couple of months later at WRC-07, and after that the EU member states 
officially had five more years for clearing the 800 MHz band for mobile by the end of 2012. Only 
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11 states actually met that goal. Even an early bird to complete the transition like Finland was not 
able to introduce 4G services on 800 MHz until in January 2014. So the process as a whole took 
altogether about 18 years. 
This time, the process of releasing more UHF spectrum in Europe is most of all driven by 
the mobile industry (Ala-Fossi and Lax 2016; Harvey and Ala-Fossi 2016). We can perhaps assume 
that any of the European broadcasters had not even seriously considered the possibility of losing the 
700 MHz band before the WRC-12, so they probably had not made any plans for abandoning it in 
advance. Now as the reallocation of the band was confirmed at WRC-15, the European Commission 
suggested that the process of clearing the 700 MHz band as the second digital dividend should be 
completed in 4.5 years, by the end of June 2020 in all EU countries (EC 2016). This leaves less than 
8 years between the very first surprise and actually getting out of the way of the new mobile 
broadband services. So the timetable of this second transition is a bit ambitious - especially because 
some member states have nationally licenced the 700 MHz band for broadcast use beyond 2020 (EP 
2016, 3). 
The second digital dividend (96 MHz) is not only about 30 per cent of the current spectrum 
resources of television in Europe, but also more than 30 per cent larger piece of the UHF spectrum 
than the first one (72 MHz). In addition, the number of the digital terrestrial television (DTT) 
channels to be moved is now significantly higher than it was at end of the analogue age. According 
to a recent consultancy report commissioned by the EU, a simple re-stacking of the existing services 
into the remaining parts of the UHF would not be enough. For example, in Finland 21 and in Spain 
44 transmitters would be left without a UHF frequency to operate on (LST 2016, 28). This means 
that the only rational way to clear more UHF spectrum in Europe without closing down a large 
number of existing DTT services is a transition to a more advanced and spectrum-efficient version 
of the digital television technology standard. In other words, a second and this time also all-digital 
switchover from an old digital TV system (DVB-T) to a new digital TV system (DVB-T2). The 
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challenges are almost the same as with the earlier switchover, although this time even some 
broadcasters expect that even the new digital broadcast television system will not be used very long 
beyond 2030 but replaced by internet protocol (IP) delivery over telecom networks (Ala-Fossi and 
Lax 2016). The future for the additional technology investments which the broadcasters and the 
consumers are now forced to make is much less stable and clear than before. Thanks to the 
“flexibility option” there would be no guarantee about any length of the lifecycle of DVB-T2 or 
about sufficient resources for DTT. Moreover, all that money could have well been used for many 
other purposes.  
The cost of necessary re-engineering of the DTT networks in the EU countries has been 
estimated to be €888 million at the most – while the potential user equipment expenses range from 
€492 million to €4169 million a) depending on the version of the replacement system (DVB-T2/ 
MPEG4 or DVB-T2/ HEVC) and b) the speed of the transition – or the length of the period of 
simulcasting services with both old and new systems (LS telcom 2016, 80). Finland was the first in 
Europe (2012) to make a national decision about clearing the 700 MHz band and it was planning to 
continue simulcasting until 2026, but in April 2016 the Finnish broadcasters agreed on completing 
the transition already 2020. The first generation digital TV (DVB-T) in Finland will then reach only 
the age of 19 (2001-2020).  A shorter simulcasting period saves broadcaster’s distribution expenses 
but forces more consumers to replace their reception equipment prematurely. For example, France 
is accelerating the clearance of 700 MHz band with state aid of €56.9 million for supporting the 
households with most extra expenses caused by the transition (EC 2016c). It is perhaps interesting 
that the mobile industry is not supposed to take part in any of these additional costs, although this 
whole expensive process is about clearing more spectrum space for expanding its commercial 
business.   
It is not a secret of any kind that the mobile industry would like to overtake the entire UHF 
band everywhere for mobile broadband use to create a global market for compatible mobile systems 
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and devices.  Several countries including the United States, Canada and Finland supported already 
at the WRC-15 the idea of releasing the UHF from exclusive broadcast use for both broadcast and 
mobile use. So far, this kind of change has eventually led into complete reallocation of the 
particular spectrum into mobile use only. No wonder that the LS telcom report (2016) for the 
Commission has included also this scenario. The pressure on UHF is there already and it is not 
likely to decrease in the coming years, especially because the US and Canada have already decided 
to repurpose the 600 MHz band from broadcasting to mobile and the Commission plans “flexible 
use” of sub-700 MHz.  In practice, opening the lower part of the UHF for mobile broadband 
downlink use on the basis of national decisions would be very much in line what Finland was 
already suggesting at WRC-15. No wonder that this time the Finnish government would be 
absolutely happy to follow the European Commission proposal to the letter (MINTC 2016) while 
the European Parliament Committee on Culture and Education of the is strictly against it (EP 2016). 
In this context, it is very likely that the space available on UHF band may shrink further for a reason 
or another even if Europe could stick to TV broadcasting on that particular part of spectrum. 
This in turn will challenge the long-time European efforts to switch from analogue to digital 
terrestrial radio, which have so far taken up more spectrum space for audio broadcasting instead of 
creating any digital dividend.  Ironically, the only spectrum release provided by digitalization of 
radio was so called L-band (1452-1479.5 MHz), which was reallocated for mobile use at WRC-15 
because nobody had eventually taken it for digital radio use. Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) 
was originally developed to replace analogue FM on the VHF II band, more commonly known as 
the FM band (87.5-108 MHz). However, the broadcasters rejected the idea of switching off FM 
radio in the 1990s. So DAB was then instead introduced on VHF III (174-230 MHz), spectrum 
recently released from analogue television. So far, only Norway has made official plans for 
switching off nationwide FM. There are several European countries where DAB/DAB+ radio 
occupies the entire VHF III spectrum (56 MHz), but where FM radio with significantly less 
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spectrum on VHF II  (20,5 MHz) still has more listeners - and in this way, perhaps more spectrum 
efficient. Although the success of DAB among listeners has not been as good as originally 
expected, it may have turned into a strategic blocking tool in the battle over the European UHF 
spectrum. As long as it exists, the broadcasters can use it as an excuse for not releasing more UHF 
for mobile by using the VHF III band for television. In Finland VHF III was reallocated for DVB-
T2 television use in 2009, four years after switching off DAB radio. (Ala-Fossi 2016c; Ala-Fossi 
and Bonet 2016)  
The EU Commission is economically rational rather than simply logical 
When the current President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker started his 
five-year term in 2014, he made a Europe-wide reform of spectrum management one of his first 
priorities. According to Juncker, “breaking down the national silos” in the management of radio 
waves was essential for creating a digital single market providing growth and jobs in Europe 
(Juncker 2014). The idea of EU-wide spectrum management agency was suggested for the first time 
already in 2006 by Viviane Reding, who was at the time a European Commissioner for the 
Information Society. Reding thought that it was a competitive disadvantage for Europe to have a 
number of nation-based spectrum management agencies instead of just one centralized agency for 
the entire market like in the US, but her proposal for establishing European Electronic 
Communications Market Authority (EECMA) was determinedly rejected by the member states. 
Seven years later in 2013, Redings successor, the European Commissioner for the Digital Agenda 
Nellie Kroes tried to include a major spectrum management reform into the new EU Telecom 
Package, but by the time the legislation was adopted in 2015, there were no traces of any spectrum 
measures (Sims et al. 2015, 190-193). So there is a tension between the EU member states and the 
European Commission, who wants to centralize the management of radio spectrum for the common 
good through the harmonization of spectrum use.  
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The efforts of the Commission to increase its power on European spectrum management are 
most probably not reflecting any strict federalist strategy as much as its tendency to see the radio 
spectrum primarily as an economic resource, which management and commercial use should be 
harmonized on the European level for maximum economic output. There is no doubt whether the 
Commission is aware of the economic importance of the spectrum as vital resource for future 
growth.  The spectrum has been described as “the lifeblood of Information Society” by Viviane 
Reding (EC 2005) and later on, increasingly less dramatic way as “economic oxygen” by Nellie 
Kroes (EC 2012) and most recently as “oxygen for the internet” by Andrus Ansip (EC 2015).  But 
the Commission does not seem to understand very well the importance of the radio spectrum for 
other than economic purposes in fields outside of its own jurisdiction. Especially in the NATO 
member states (22 of the 28 EU member states), the military is one the most important users of the 
spectrum. For example in the UK, a bit over half of the radio spectrum is occupied by the public 
sector, and 75 per cent of this space below 5GHz is used by the British Ministry of Defence, which 
usually does not even specify the exact purposes for national security reasons. (Sims et al. 2015, 56, 
179) So it is very hard to imagine that the member states would ever let the EU to take over the 
management of the entire radio spectrum in Europe.  
In general, it could be argued that in its pursuit to promote economic growth, the European 
Commission is primarily economically rational, pragmatic and even opportunist rather than purely 
logical. Although the European Union officially follows the principle of technological neutrality- 
not taking a stand for or favouring any system over another but letting the market forces to decide 
(Kamecke and Körber 2008) - the Commission has not been even a bit embarrassed or apologetic in 
its attempts to totally bypass the market mechanisms to promote and favour a European technology 
over other options when possible. For example, the EU Commission made its support for DVB-H 
digital mobile TV system developed by Nokia in Finland very clear. It even made DVB-H one of 
the Official standards of the EU, hoping that it would help this system conquer the entire world. 
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Although DVB-H system was considered to be a brilliant piece of engineering, but it turned out to 
be a commercial failure in the consumer markets. (Sims et al. 2015, 192; Ala-Fossi 2016a, 279) 
This makes it perhaps easier to understand why the European Commission has on the one 
hand been striving very hard to create Europe-wide decisions over protecting the UHF spectrum for 
broadcast use, but on the other hand it has also introduced a “flexibility option” for an alternative 
use of the broadcast spectrum - which is in fact increasing the risk of national fragmentation of the 
UHF spectrum use as well as introducing a risk of additional interference for broadcasting (LST 
2016; EP 2016). European harmonization of the national schedules for the 700 MHz spectrum 
release is likely to promote new economic activity, but saving the remaining UHF band exclusively 
for broadcasting is not. Instead, the Commission would like to see at least some EU member states 
to introduce also LTE-based broadcast / downlink services, based on another European technology 
originally developed by Ericsson to compete with DVB-H (Multimedia Broadcast Multicast 
Service, MBMS). To summarize, from the perspective of the European Commission, the radio 
spectrum is most of all a key economic resource for the future growth – which is most likely created  
with something else than traditional broadcasting.  
Although the European broadcasters should not rely on the European Union and the 
European Commission simply as friends or loyal supporters, which would always provide 
supranational protection for the broadcast spectrum, they should see EU as a useful strategic ally. 
The EU is supposed to be striving for a common good of all Europe – a compromise with the 
greatest common denominator, which can be accepted or at least tolerated in all member states. This 
means for example that even though the EU Commission and the current government of Finland 
both see radio spectrum primarily as an economic resource and expect significant growth from the 
mobile industry, the Commission did not simply propose a rapid reallocation of the entire UHF 
band in the EU as there were too many large member states with their own interests against this 
idea. Sometimes the European approach can look rather cumbersome and complex – and it can 
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blamed to be stagnant and not dynamic (Pursiainen 2015).  However, the hidden beauty of the “one-
size fits all Europe”-approach is that in this way the European Union – the Commission, Parliament 
and the Council together - usually create a balancing act against extreme or strongly deviating 
national policies  by prioritizing the interest of Europe as a whole over national interests.  So the 
future of broadcasting in Europe is eventually in the hands of the largest and the most influential 
EU member states: as long as they appreciate broadcasting as a form of communication, it will stay.  
Discussion 
Perhaps the best answer to the question in the title of this chapter is that WRC-15 represents both an 
end of an era as well a new beginning. The long era of undisputed European dominance in the ITU 
Region 1 spectrum planning and the unhesitating or unfaltering support of the interests of the 
European (public) broadcasters by the respective European governments is most probably over. 
This does not mean that Europe would have lost its influence and power in the ITU region 1 
completely – or broadcasters would have totally lost their special position as a socially and 
culturally privileged form of communication.  
But in order to reach their goals, they have to negotiate more and also make more compromises in 
the future. The new post-broadcast era will be less stable and more unpredictable: nothing should be 
taken for granted anymore. There will be more competition or even a political battle over the scarce 
resources like spectrum on both national and international levels. Moreover, it is very likely that the 
strategic choices made by the African and Asian countries will shape the European policies more 
than before and the preferences of the consumers especially in the large Asian markets like India 
will increasingly shape the policy choices and receiver devices available also for the European 
markets - and no longer the vice versa. It is likely that the European public service broadcasters 
(PSB) will end up between a rock and a hard place. In case PSBs do not have sufficient freedom 
and resources to both expand online and to continue broadcasting, they will not be able to fulfil 
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their public service mission and legal obligations for universality in the evolving digital media 
environment (Ala-Fossi and Lax 2016; Ala-Fossi 2016b).  
In general, it seems that for the European broadcasters the WRC-15 was more like the victory of 
Pyrrhos than the outcome of the battle of Salamis. Couple of more victorious WRCs like this one 
and terrestrial broadcasting will be history in Europe. The WRC-15 was most certainly not a 
beginning of a new era of peace, harmony and mutual understanding but rather a taster of what is to 
come in the ongoing conflict over the UHF spectrum space and consequently, the future of the free-
to-air terrestrial television broadcasting. The mobile industry wants the UHF band, no matter is 
television dead or alive, but it certainly would be much easier if terrestrial broadcast television 
would have first passed away as this creative destruction would release spectrum resources in the 
evolutionary cycle of the survival of the fittest (Ala-Fossi and Lax 2016). When looking at the 
coming new era of European broadcasting, it is regrettably easy to agree again with Winston 
Churchill: “I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat."4 
 
  
  
                                                          
4 See http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/92-blood-toil-tears-and-sweat 
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